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ABSTRACT 
This paper sets out to explore two aspects of the convention of collective cabinet 
responsibility, the manner in which it has evolved in recent times, and the reflection of 
this process in the provisions of the Cabinet Manual. 
The paper proceeds in four main sections. The first contains a theoretical examination of 
conventions generally, in which the aim is to provide a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of change in conventions. The second is an examination of the traditional model 
of collective responsibility under first past the post systems. The third examines factors 
which have influenced the doctrine in recent times in this country. The last section 
considers the latest edition of the Cabinet Manual in detail. 
The view will be offered that the present government has reacted to changes in prevailing 
political circumstances. The result has been a re-definition of collective responsibility 
and the way it functions in this country. This allows limited differentiation between the 
coalition partners. In association with this, the Cabinet Manual has been amended. 
While this has exposed both the nature of the convention and the status of the Manual as 
a constitutional text to a period of uncertainty, the means of change was appropriate to 
the New Zealand political climate and tradition. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page and footnotes) comprises approximately 
12500 words . 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The definition and description of constitutional conventions has always been 
regarded as a tricky exercise. Conventions have been compared to the procreation 
of eels, somewhat vague and slippery. 1 This is so even at times when the 
convention could be described as relatively stable in nature. This is largely 
because conventions describe patterns of historical conduct. These are open to 
subjective interpretation by political actors and commentators alike. Few have 
any authoritative form of statement as to their nature.2 
Conventions are very much tied to the political environment at a given time. 
When change occurs in surrounding political circumstances, conventions often 
change to adapt. This makes the exercise of characterising a particular 
convention at a time of such change even more difficult. It calls for an 
assessment of the significance of the changes for the convention. If such a change 
does occur, how is the new rule to be characterised, by what process and by 
whom? 
Until relatively recently, New Zealand's conventions relating to the doctrine of 
collective cabinet responsibility followed the traditional Westminster model. 
Cabinet considered its policy initiatives in private, and defended them as one. In 
the last two decades, however, New Zealand has been changing the way in which 
it governs itself. Legislation has been enacted which makes government a more 
transparent exercise. Calls for a more proportional electoral process have seen the 
adoption of the Mixed Member Proportional ("MMP") system. These changes 
have influenced the way in which collective responsibility is defined in this 
country. 
1 Geoffrey Marshall Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability (Revised 
Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986) 54 
2 CJG Sampford " Recognise and Declare": An Australian Experiment in Codifying Constitutional 
Conventions" ( 1987) Public Law, Summer, 369 
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In April of this year, a new edition of the Cabinet Manual was published. This 
document provides guidance on a number of factors relating to Cabinet 
government in this country. It includes statements as to the nature and effect of 
collective responsibility. Not least among the features of the new edition are 
substantive changes to these descriptions. The changes were designed to reflect a 
new mechanism created by the two present government coalition partners to 
enhance coalition, and therefore governmental, stability. 
This paper sets out to explore two main themes, the changing nature of collective 
responsibility in this country and the role of the Cabinet Manual in reflecting and 
promoting this change. The view will be expressed that a re-definition of 
collective responsibility was a reaction to changes in prevailing political 
circumstances. This was an appropriate response to developments which 
rendered some of the rationales behind the doctrine redundant. It has, however, 
exposed both the doctrine and the authoritativeness of the Manual to a period of 
uncertainty. 
The discussion of this topic falls into four main sections. The first will examine a 
number of aspects of conventional theory. In particular, it will look at questions 
of how conventions are to be distinguished from "laws", and what lies behind 
their authority as unwritten "rules" of the constitution. We will examine the 
manner in which conventions evolve, and the effects of codification. The purpose 
of this section is to lay a theoretical foundation for assessment of the changes in 
the doctrine, the degree to which it can be described as "constitutional" and the 
Manual 's authoritativeness in capturing its nature. 
The second section will examine the traditional Westminster model of collective 
cabinet responsibility, and the manner in which it operated in this country prior to 
the adoption of MMP in 1996. We will see that in theory at least, the nature of 
the rule was clearly defined and consistently understood. The view will be 
expressed, however, that the doctrine was as much a matter of party politics as of 
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constitutional principle. Pragmatism and intra-party discipline were major 
features of its interpretation in individual cases. 
The third section will examine the external factors operating on the convention 
recently, in particular the move towards a more open and transparent style of 
government. The view will be offered that while these forces have necessarily 
brought about evolution in the nature of the convention, it would be wrong to 
characterise this process as "erosion." Instead, the doctrine has been re-defined. 
However, if future governments shift back to traditional notions of collective 
responsibility, the doctrine would be exposed to uncertainty in terms of definition 
and criticism that it is a matter of individual governments' policy. 
Finally, we will examine the changes made to the Cabinet Manual in its latest 
incarnation. This section will consider the philosophy behind the changes, and 
the substantive amendments that have been made. While the Manual has been 
said to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, this statement downplays its role in 
the recent re-definition of the convention. Rather than stifling evolution of the 
convention, as has been suggested by an English academic,3 the Manual supports 
and reinforces the development of the doctrine. 
An assessment will be made of the degree to which the Cabinet Manual can be 
regarded as an authoritative statement of the current nature of collective 
responsibility in this country. Since the Manual now describes the influence of 
the coalition management system on collective responsibility, it is similarly open 
to revision should the next government not wish to operate under this system. 
This would add to uncertainty about the authoritativeness of the Manual as a 
constitutional document. 
3 Barry Hough, "Constitutional Law, Conventions and Democracy" (2000) 29(3) Anglo-American Law 
Review, 368, 382 
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II THE THEORY OF CONVENTIONS 
Conventions can be difficult concepts to discuss. This stems mainly from the fact 
that they have an inherently subjective aspect. A form of political conduct could 
be said to comply with convention, to be in breach of convention or modifying the 
convention, depending on the political position of the commentator. By 
consideration of a number of the aspects of conventions generally, however, we 
can gain insights into their nature as constitutional concepts. 
A What factors characterise a convention? 
The task of definition of conventions has occupied academic writers since Dicey 
first wrote of unwritten maxims of constitutional conduct. They have been 
described as the "flesh that clothes the dry bones of the law"
4 and the "rules 
accepted as obligatory by those concerned with the workings of the constitution."
5 
However, labelling conventions sometimes fails to convey their significance for 
the study of constitutional law. It is more satisfying and productive in this context 
to identify factors common to them. 
Two models have gained common usage. The first was expounded by Sir Ivor 
Jennings, writing in the middle of the 201h century. He considered that in order to 
be considered as a convention, a political usage must: 
1. have a precedent; 
2. be considered binding by the actors to which it related; and 
3. have a reason or high principle behind it. 6 
Jennings took the view that a combination of two of these factors would result in 
status as a convention. Any number of precedents would not, on their own, 
justify a usage being considered a convention if there was no constitutional 
4 Jennings, The law and the Constitution, (5 1h edition, University of London Press, London 1959) 81-82 
[ "The law and the Constitution"] 
5 Wheare, Modern Constitutions, quoted in Marshall , above n I, 7 
6 The law and the Constitution, above n4, 136 
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principle at stake. Likewise, an act of political principle without a precedent 
could not be considered a convention. 
It seems, however, that Jennings was insufficiently swayed by the importance of 
the individual factors in his equation. It is submitted that the better view is that all 
three elements are required. A precedent with a good reason is of no use if widely 
ignored. A view that an actor is bound by precedent is irrelevant if there is no 
normative principle at stake. This is a "habit" or "pattern", but is not a 
"convention". Likewise, a view that a politician should act in a certain way is not 
convention unless they are bound by precedent. 
The other model accepted as part of conventional wisdom concentrates on two 
alternative theories , explaining the obligatory nature of conventions.
7 They are 
either: 
1. The rules by which the actors believe themselves to be bound (the 
"positive morality"); or 
2. The rules by which the actors ought to believe themselves bound (the 
"critical morality"). 
Positive morality describes compliance; the rule is a convention because the 
actors accord it that status. Critical morality is a normative rule of absolutes; the 
rule is a convention because, properly directing themselves, the actors would 
accord the rule convention status and consider themselves bound. Some authors 
have taken the view that both requirements are necessary for the matter to warrant 
status as a convention. 8 This seems to be correct. The rule will never be a 
convention, no matter how worthy it may be, if not thought binding by the actors 
it purports to govern. On the other hand, a mistaken belief that a rule is binding 
will not accord a practice status as a convention. 
7 Marshall , above n 1, 10 
8 Phillip Joseph , Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (The Law Book Company, 
Sydney, 1993), 243.[" Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand"] 
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In addition to these factors, scholars have expressed the view that practices 
require an element of "constitutional necessity."
9 To put it slightly differently, all 
conventions can be described as "practices", but not all practices are conventions. 
The difference lies in an additional element of constitutional significance. How is 
this to be measured? One test promoted is that breach of the convention would 
necessarily lead to significant political upheaval. 10 This concept is, however, 
rather vague. Political upheaval could mean anything from a general election to a 
major re-structuring of the constitution. 
Another test proposed is that to be regarded as "constitutional" a practice must 
transcend "the sectional interests of political party".
11 An example drawn in this 
regard has been the operation of collective responsibility within the ranks of 
opposition parties under Westminster-style FPP systems.
12 Jaconelli and Joseph 
both note that a shadow minister is just as likely as his government equivalent to 
be removed from the front benches for public dissent. This, they argue, is 
evidence that the doctrine of collective responsibility is a matter of party political 
discipline, rather than constitutional significance. 
This analogy is not beyond criticism. As we will see later in this paper, the 
relationship between unanimity and confidence does have constitutional 
ramifications. 13 There is, however, force in the view that purely intra-party 
concerns should be removed from conventional status. A political actor might 
feel bound by precedent to act in a certain way. There may be an imposing 
rationale behind the precedent. Neither of these accords the practice 
constitutional significance, if both precedent and reason have no significance 
outside party political interests . 
9 Phillip Joseph , "The Honourable OF Quigley' s Resignation Strictly Political- Not Constitutional" ( 1982) 
I Canta. L.R. 428 , 430 ["The Honourable OF Quigley ' s Resignation"] 
10 "The Honourable OF Quigley ' s Resignation", above n9, 431 
11 Joseph Jaconelli , "The Nature of Constitutional Convention" (1999) 19( I) Legal Studies, 24, 35 
12 Jaconelli, above n 11 , 35 and "The Honourable OF Quigley ' s Resignation", above n9, 434 
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B Conventions and law 
The distinction between law and convention has been at the centre of much of the 
theoretical debate on this topic in the last two centuries. 
14 Dicey saw a basis for 
the distinction in the enforcement by the courts of laws but not of conventions.
15 
Analysis of this test has centred on questions of whether statutes excluding the 
court's jurisdiction are "enforced". Jennings referred to duties imposed by Public 
Health Acts. 16 Sanctions were imposed on private citizens, while remedies 
against public bodies were limited to complaint procedures. In support of Dicey's 
test, Munro argues that where the courts refuse to act, they are "enforcing the 
law". 17 While this is no doubt true in the context of what is required of the Court 
by a particular statute, it is doubtful whether the theory is faithful to the spirit of 
Dicey's theory. Dicey was referring to "enforcement" in the sense of providing a 
remedy which could be "enforced" or which guaranteed compliance with a legal 
standard. 
It seems that these debates have strayed into the over-literal. Whether a particular 
law is enforceable in the courts tells us little about the nature of conventions 
generally. The real distinction lies in the consequences of breach for the 
continuance of the rule. Breach of a convention will not always instantly change 
the nature of a convention. However, conventions continue to exist, or evolve, or 
cease to exist, because of observance, partial observance, or non-observance 
respectively. Should these norms be widely and regularly avoided, this will have 
an effect; the convention will, in time, be eroded. Political actors will derive 
precedent from earlier breaches. This would be particularly so if the earlier 
13 This will be dealt with under the heading "Constitutional Convention or Rule of Political Pragmatism?" 
later in this paper. 
14 For a list of the protagonists on each side, see Munro "Laws and Conventions Distinguished", 91 LQR 
218 
15 In Allorney General v. Jonathan Cape Limited [ 1976] QB 752 (HC), the convention of Cabinet secrecy 
was considered to cloak discussions in the Cabinet setting in obligations of confidentiality. That is not to 
say that the court enforced the convention, but that the operation of the convention was co-existent with, 
and gave rise to, obligations of confidentiality founded in the common law. 
16 "The Law and the Constitution", above n4, I 04 
17 Munro, above n 14,227. 
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breaches went without negative consequences or at least criticism of the actor in 
question. Conventions are, therefore, intimately tied to the conduct of the actors 
to whom they relate. 
The same cannot be said of laws. Breach of a law might result in its change, but 
by a less direct means. Widespread non-observance of speed limits on the roads 
will not automatically result in a change to the rules. Change may occur; it may 
not. If it did, it would be the result of policy decisions that the limit had been set 
too low. The change would be effected either through primary or delegated 
legislation. On this basis, laws can be seen as · having an institutional 
entrenchment that conventions lack. 
C Why are conventions observed? 
To say that a convention is a norm regarded as a rule does not explain the 
rationale behind its uniform observation by political actors. Critics of 
conventions regard them as of lesser significance than laws because people are 
not subject to sanctions following breach. This ignores two points. First, it 
underestimates the power of political sanctions to modify politicians' behaviour. 
Both the views of other politicians and the public are not to be downplayed when 
considering their influence on those acting in the area of a convention. Secondly, 
it draws on a philosophical vein which is now out of favour. Dicey was much 
influenced by Austin's proposition that all laws were the result of orders issued by 
a leader with the capacity to enforce their wishes through sanctions.
18 No 
sanction will, however, guarantee compliance. More often than not the law is 
obeyed through a sense of the greater good of society. 
In this area, conventional theory borrows heavily from social norms literature. In 
distinguishing between "habits" and "rules", Hart identified in the latter a 
18 Munro, above n 14 , 220 
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"reflective critical attitude." 19 That is, rules are social norms accepted by all 
those in a group as applying to all. Deviation from the rules would invite 
criticism from the entire group. They "ought" to be complied with. Conventions 
share these normative qualities . They are binding on political actors because they 
are accepted by all as applying across the political spectrum. 
This alone does not, however, explain conformity. Conventions come into 
existence, Dworkin argues " . . . when people follow certain rules or maxims for 
reasons that essentially include their expectation that others will follow the same 
rules or maxims .. . "20 I continue to drive on the left side of the road, not 
necessarily because the law requires it, but more because others on the road are 
doing so as well. American theorist Cass Sunstein would describe this sort of rule 
as an "incompletely theorised agreement. "2 1 People can agree that a rule is 
binding without necessarily agreeing on why, or indeed without agreeing that the 
rule is a good one. 
In the end, actors are motivated to obey conventions for the same reasons that 
explain conformity with laws, or any other form of rule. These range from a 
respect for the norms of society to political pragmatism. Indeed, Marshall notes 
that conventions are identified and considered of interest because they are 
observed and not for the motivation behind this.22 As long as prevailing political 
circumstances remain static, precedent becomes more powerful. The reason for 
the obligation ' s existence becomes less important in time. The rule becomes 
binding more because it is a rule, rather because its rationale is universally 
supported. 
19 HLA Hart, The Concept of law (Second Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) 56 
20 Ronald Dworkin, laws Empire (Fontana, London, 1986) 145 
2 1 Cass Sunstein l egal Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford University Press , New York, 1996) 35 
22 Marshall , above n 1, 6 
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D Who Defines Conventions? 
Politicians define conventions by means of their conduct. This can be seen in two 
ways. Both Marshall and Jennings recognised that it was important to define 
conventions by way of compliance with convention. Likewise, in their attempts 
to avoid the strictures of convention, politicians engage in defining conduct:
23 
"For they might deny that any such relevant rule exists; or they might 
accept that one does exist, but deny that it applies in the instant case; or 
they might, in some circumstances, say that they have agreed to waive its 
operation for the time being; or they might claim that while such a rule 
exists and their action would be in breach of it, such an infringement was 
justified by circumstances." 
Both the positive and critical morality of conventions centre on political actors. 
But Marshall ' s model raises the question - who decides what the politicians ought 
to consider themselves bound by? In other words, who defines the critical 
morality? 
In this respect, scholars and other constitutional "thinkers" have an important role 
to play. It is these experts who provide Jennings ' reason and Marshall ' s critical 
morality. Likewise, Cooray strongly recommends that tests for conventions 
consider the opinions of suitably qualified constitutional experts.
24 
Presumably, 
included in this field would be public servants, who are after all "the individuals 
who are most likely to have access to information about the precedents"
25 
concerning relevant prescribed conduct. It would be unrealistic to suggest that 
politicians conduct themselves in an information vacuum. As conventions are not 
provided for in statutes or casebooks, the writings of experts and the advice of 
23 Rodney Brazier "The Non-Legal Constitution" ( 1992) NILQ, 43 (3) 262-287, 263 
24 LJM Cooray, Conventions The Australian Constitution and the Future (Legal Books Pty Ltd, Sydney, 
1979) 75 By " suitably qualified" Cooray was not speaking of academic qualification. He was referring to a 
proposed requirement that experts declare their political interests in order that any party political affiliation 
may be taken into account in considering their advice . 
25 Hough, above n3 , 375 
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officials become a vital source of guidance as to how a given scenario requires an 
actor to behave. 
E How do Conventions Change? 
Legislation changes by vote in Parliament. Subordinate legislation does so by 
valid promulgation of orders in council, and other instruments. As a constitutional 
species defined by patterns of past political conduct, conventions offer no such 
simple system for analysing change. 
Conventions evolve through vanous forms of political conduct. Marshall 
identifies two of these. 26 The first is by response to changing political 
circumstances. As external factors influence the political landscape, principles 
requiring certain conduct can subtly change. The other is more conscious; 
political actors can agree to a change in convention. Marshall has observed:
27 
One form of conventional change is then the deliberate abrogation of an old 
convention or creation of a new one by agreement, if the old rule is felt to be 
outdated or inconvenient. In this sense of course, conventions are not rules 
that have to be followed unconditionally and permanently. It will always be 
possible for governments or politicians to propose a change in convention. 
They must be followed only in the sense that they cannot be changed 
unilaterally and must be complied with if in force until changed by 
agreement. 
These views seem to be limited somewhat by their having been expressed in the 
context of the Westminster system. The nature of the FPP system is that it tends 
to result in two relatively homogenous parties, battling for the political middle 
ground. While attempting to distinguish between themselves, they tend to 
appreciate similarities between interests in party organisational terms. Agreement 
on the nature of a convention would be an easier exercise in a system dominated 
by two parties, each of whom is in a position to assess the significance of the rule 
for that party, both in government and in opposition. The view will be expressed 
later in this paper that in New Zealand ' s MMP political system, the sort of 
26 Marshall , above n I, 217 
27 Marshall , above n I, 217 
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agreement envisaged by Marshall would present a far more complex proposition 
and lead to inaccurate results. 
Another possible vehicle for change is comment by constitutional experts. 
Politicians will be guided in their conduct by statements as to the nature and 
applicability of relevant rules. If sufficient numbers of commentators were to 
agree that the nature of a particular convention was changing, this might influence 
a politician's behaviour. This form of influence would give the politician the 
ability to deflect criticism that his or her behaviour was contrary to existing 
convention. This would then give credence to the views expressed by the 
commentators. From that point, the change in the nature of the convention could 
be little doubted. 
F The Codification of Conventions 
Conventions have generally existed in unwritten form . This has led to complaints 
that they can be subjective and open to self-serving interpretations by political 
adventurers .28 Different jurisdictions have attempted to deal with this problem in 
a variety of ways. In Canada, the Supreme Court has been used as an impartial 
arbiter of the nature of conventions.29 In Australia, the 1975 constitutional crisis 
led to a gathering of politicians in an attempt to "recognise and declare" the nature 
of certain constitutional conventions in some form of authoritative statement.
30 
This process of embodying convention in documents without legal force has been 
described as "soft" codification.31 However, the authoritativeness of any codified 
statement of a convention depends on a number of factors . 
1 The Accuracy Factor 
If the text of a statement were to capture the essence of a convention in terms 
widely regarded as accurate, its authority would be considerable. It would be used 
28 "Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand", above n8 , 266 
29 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada ( 1981) 125 DLR (J 'd) I (SCC) 
30 Sampford, above n2 
17 
by political actors seeking to invoke its terms in support of their conduct, or to 
condemn the conduct of others.32 Those attempting to evade the terms of the 
stated convention would be left to argue that the convention did not apply to the 
given circumstances. On the other hand, if the terms of the statement failed 
accurately to capture the nature of a convention, its authority would be subject to 
attack. 
2 The Acceptance Factor 
Rather tautologically, it has been suggested that written statements of conventions 
carry the authority they are accorded. Authority in terms of the convention is 
"absolutely dependant on the reactions of others. "
33 In fact, this is something of a 
truism in relation to conventions, in the sense that even in unwritten form they are 
only what political actors are prepared to accept they are. In New Zealand, the 
acceptance of the Cabinet Manual is institutionalised by the practice of an 
incoming Cabinet voting to abide by its terms.
34 This endorses the Manual as an 
authoritative statement of the conventions contained in it. 
3 The Agreement Factor 
A statement of the nature of a convention agreed across the political spectrum 
would have potential for considerable authority. This is, however, not without its 
problems in terms of conventional theory. It leaves open the possibility that 
"political disagreement over the scope of some conventions might only be 
overcome by compromise, perhaps entailing an unhelpful lack of clarity in 
drafting. "35 
Soft codification has also been criticised for inhibiting spontaneous development 
of conventions. Hough suggests that "politicians would risk controversy if they 
31 This is as opposed to the "hard' ' codification embodied by legislation. Hough, above n3 , 381 
32 Sampford, above n2 , 384 
33 Sampford, above n2, 385 
34 Elizabeth McLeay, "What is the Constitutional Status of the New Zealand Cabinet Office Manual" 
( 1999) I O Public Law Review 11, 13 ["Cabinet Office Manual"] 
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departed from an authoritatively declared precedent."
36 
This issue will be 
examined later in this paper with reference to the New Zealand experience. The 
view will be offered that this has not been the case in this country. In fact , the 
new edition of the Cabinet Manual owes its existence to the operation of external 
factors on the convention. 
We see then that conventions are forms of political conduct that actors view as 
binding upon them. They range from the clearly constitutional to the 
pragmatically political. The question of where the line is drawn between 
"constitutional conventions" and political practices is unclear. It may well depend 
upon the definitions adopted. Conventions are defined both by action and by 
statement. They tend to evolve to reflect changes in the political environment. 
Short-term changes are, however, excluded from influencing true conventions. 
They indicate political preferences rather than constitutional rules. While 
unilateral change in convention is frowned upon by those who conform to the 
traditional view, this may be unduly restrictive in its approach. The codification 
of conventions can lead to a range of outcomes, depending on, among other 
things, the authority the statement is accorded by political actors. 
Having considered the theory of conventions, albeit briefly, we are now equipped 
to discuss the more practical aspects of individual conventions. We tum now to 
consider in detail the convention of collective cabinet responsibility in New 
Zealand. 
35 Hough, above n3 , 381 
36 Hough. above n3 . 382 
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III CABINET AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
A The Origins of Collective Responsibility 
Cabinet has been described as a centre of political and governmental power within 
the Westminster system.37 However, it is unusual as a vehicle of such influence 
in that its powers are largely unprescribed by law. While first mentioned in a 
New Zealand statute in 1870,38 legislative references to Cabinet remain few and 
far between. Its practices and rules are "embodied by that set of evolving 
principles known as constitutional conventions. "39 
Scholars tend to agree that, in order to trace the origins of Cabinet influence, one 
has to go back to the United Kingdom Reform Act of 1867, and the General 
Election in the following year. The Act resulted in an enlarged electorate, which 
had the effect of focussing politicians on issues of national importance. Political 
parties became associated with certain long-term policies. They became 
increasingly centralised and exerted greater influence over local candidates. 
Adherence to the policies articulated at the national centre became seen as 
increasingly important in order to be elected. Thus the independence crf 
individual MPs was reduced and the strength of party leaders was enhanced.
40 
The First Past the Post ("FPP") electoral system allowed the executive to 
dominate the legislature through its elected majority. As a result of this, battles 
within the legislature became focussed on either getting or retaining governmental 
power. Party discipline grew in importance. The centralisation of political power 
saw the leadership of the governing party dictating policy and requiring strict 
adherence from its caucus. The requirement that a party either unite or face a 
37 Sir Ivor Jennings Cabinet Government (3'd edition, Cambridge University Press , Cambridge, I 959) I 0, 
[ '"Cabinet Government " ], John P McIntosh The British Cabinet (London, Sweet & Sons, 1962) I I 
38 Appropriations Act I 870 
39 KJ Scott The New Zealand Constitution (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1962) 96 
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period on the opposition benches provided strong motivation for a collective 
approach to the articulation of policy to the electorate. 
Historically, New Zealand borrowed much from the Westminster tradition. Such 
was the degree of replication of the dominant features of the Westminster system 
in this country that New Zealand was once described as "the purest example of 
the Westminster model of governrnent."
41 During the 201h Century, the features 
of the constitutional landscape in this country were a simple plurality electoral 
system, cabinet government dominated by one or other of two main political 
parties and an unwritten constitution.
42 Having so closely followed the 
Westminster model, it is no surprise that New Zealand also inherited many of the 
constitutional conventions that had evolved in the United Kingdom. 
B The Convention of Collective Responsibility 
Throughout the 201h Century, both the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
embraced the notion of a strong cabinet, consisting of representatives of only one 
party, collectively responsible to the legislature. The convention has been 
described as follows: 43 
Absolute frankness in our private relations and full discussion of all matters 
of common interest ... the decisions freely arrived at should be loyally 
supported and considered as the decisions of the whole of the Government. 
Of course there may be occasions in which the difference is of so vital a 
character that it is impossible for the minority ... to continue their support, and 
in this case the Ministry breaks up or the minority member or members 
resigns. 
40 McIntosh above n37, 162-164 
41 A Lijphart "The Demise of the Last Westminster System? Comments on the Report of New Zealand's 
Royal Commission on the Electoral System" Electoral Studies Vo! 6 ( 1987) 97 
42 Elizabeth McLeay The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand, (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1995) 7 ["The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand"] 
43 life of Joseph Chamberlain, quoted in "Cabinet Government ", above n37, 277 
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The conventional wisdom is that the traditional model of collective responsibility 
consists of three elements: 
(i) Confidence 
(ii) Unanimity, and 
(iii) Confidentiality44 
The first deals with the basis on which Cabinet is in a position to govern. The 
other two relate to the ways in which Cabinet acts while it is in power. 
1 Confidence 
Governments enjoy the confidence of Parliament through an elected majority. 
Under an FPP system, confidence is lost if the ruling party loses a vote of 
confidence in the House. Convention requires that in the event of a loss of 
confidence, the Prime Minister should resign and call a general election, unless an 
alternative government can be formed .45 
2 Unanimity 
Essentially, the convention requires that members of Cabinet "all tell the same 
story."46 It recognises a strong electorate preference for a unified government. 47 
The notion of unanimity is designed to allow the executive to debate issues within 
the cabinet context, and then emerge with a clearly defined policy, which it is then 
in a position to implement, and defend against criticism from the opposition, the 
media and the electorate. 48 
44 Marshall , above n l , 55 
45 Marshall , above n l , 55 
46 "The law and the Constitution", above n4, 278 
47 Geoffrey Palmer, New Zealand 's Constitution in Crisis, (John Mcindoe, Dunedin, 1992) 158 
48 Occasionally, the critics might also emerge from the ruling party ' s backbenches. 
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3 Confidentiality 
Cabinet conducts its affairs in secret. It was not until 1948 that a Secretary was 
admitted for the purpose ofrecording proceedings. 49 Even so, the only formal 
minutes taken record decisions made, as opposed to views expressed. The 
essence of this rule cannot be properly understood in isolation. It only makes 
sense when viewed in conjunction with the unanimity rule. 
The penalty for breach of the confidentiality and unanimity rules is resignation. 50 
Public dissociation from concluded policy has as its quid pro quo removal from a 
body which supports the policy as one. Opposition to policy from within may 
exist. However, if the convention in its traditional form has force , then that 
opposition is not publicly articulated. The concept of a unanimous Cabinet is, 
therefore, more apparent than real. It has been described as a "fiction. "51 The 
result is, however, a clear policy direction, which can then be implemented by 
C b. · 52 a met as one entity. 
Two mam theories have been advanced as to the rationale behind the 
confidentiality requirement. According to the first , Cabinet often has to consider 
issues of a highly sensitive political nature. It must be in a position to take advice 
from civil servants and to discuss these issues before coming to a decision as to 
the policy to be initiated. 53 Without the protection of the convention, the candour 
of the advice provided by officials could no longer be taken for granted . . 
However, this argument has not met with unqualified support. A Law 
Commission report into the Official Information Act 1982 concluded that the 
49 David Lange, Foreword to the Cabinet Office Manual 1979 ( 1984 re-print) 
50 Matthew Palmer, "Single Party Majority Government in New Zealand: Collective Cabinet Decision 
Making in New Zealand" in M Laver and KA Shepsle, eds, Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary 
Government (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994) 235 
5 1 Geoffrey Palmer, above n47, 153 
52 Palmer refers to the rule being useful for controlling caucus as well as the legislature. A united Cabinet is 
far less likely to suffer criticism from within caucus, by leading with clear policy direction . 
53 Attorney General v Jonathan Cape Limited above n 15 
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opposite was true; the chance that the advice might be open to public scrutiny was 
just as likely to have a favourable impact on the quality of advice provided. 54 
The second basis for Cabinet secrecy is that disclosure might result in "ill-
informed or captious public or political criticism."55 In other words, Cabinet has 
enough on its plate dealing with criticism of its policy once concluded. Criticism 
of the merits of that policy during its consideration would be too great a 
distraction . This view has been criticised for ignoring the reason for having an 
opposition party in a Westminster-style political system. The opposition ' s role is 
to provide criticism of government policy, thereby testing it before the 
electorate. 56 
In fact, both of these theories call for an element of balance. Cabinet is an 
example of government by committee. 57 This implies differences in approaches 
to policy issues, and sometimes disagreement. The opposition ' s role is to criticise 
and attack government policy. This is to be encouraged. However, it seems right 
not to allow the opposition the unfair advantage of criticising policy that has not 
been formally endorsed. Frequent exposure of differences within the Cabinet 
ranks might be used to paint a picture of an executive which is unable to agree, 
and therefore unfit to govern. While a degree of debate is only to be expected 
once policy has been concluded, a government should be allowed to take advice 
and develop its policies in private. 
C Constitutional Convention or a Rule of Political Pragmatism? 
Three instances from the 20111 Century demonstrate the arguable nature of the 
doctrine of collective responsibility in New Zealand. In 1932, the Minister of 
Finance, W Downie Stewart, publicly criticised Cabinet policy on a major 
financial issue, the reduction of rents and interest rates . This difference of 
54 Law Commission Report 40 Review o/Ehe Official Information Act /982, 81 
55 Conway v Rimmer [ 1968] AC 910, 952 (HL) per Lord Reid 
56 "The Honourable OF Quigley ' s Resignation" above n 9, 428 
57 "The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand", above n42 , Chapter 5. 
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opinion was notable not only because it related to Downie Stewart' s portfolio, but 
also because he went so far as to vote against the issue in the House.
58 The 
potential controversy was reduced in impact somewhat by an announcement that 
Cabinet had "agreed to differ" on this issue. In any event, within a year, his 
differences with Cabinet resulted in his resignation. 
In 1981, the Minister of Maori Affairs and of Police, Ben Couch, made a number 
of statements that seemed supportive of the South African "separate 
development" policy. This was contrary to the terms of the Gleneagles 
Agreement, recently signed by the Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon. Another 
Minister, DS Thompson, suggested that Couch's comments might be interpreted 
as "a Minister disputing a government decision." When the Prime Minister was 
asked to comment, he referred the media to Mr Thompson whose views, he said, 
were those of the government. Couch was not asked either to retract his 
comments or resign. 
Only a year later in 1982, the Minister of Works and Development, Derek 
Quigley, made a speech to the Young Nationals, criticising the National 
government' s "Think Big" policy. Mr Muldoon said that Quigley's comments 
went beyond what was acceptable, and offered him the alternatives of apology to 
his Cabinet colleagues or resignation. Quigley opted for the latter. 
These three incidents arose out of essentially the same scenario, a Minister 
publicly differing from agreed Cabinet policy. They were resolved in three very 
different ways. It has been suggested that a mitigating factor was that Downie 
Stewart ' s position was at the extreme end of the political spectrum, rather than 
closer to the opposition. 59 A more likely explanation, however, is that the 
government had sufficient backing for its policy in the House and was not, 
58 Scott, above n39 , 115 
59 Scott, above n39, 115 
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therefore, in danger of facing a confidence issue in relation to Downie Stewart's 
conduct. 
The distinction between the treatments meted out by the same Prime Minister to 
Couch and Quigley betrays the inherently political nature of the operation of the 
doctrine of collective responsibility. It has been suggested that the former faced 
no consequences because "the Prime Minister, perhaps supported by Cabinet, did 
not think that the Minister's conduct would damage the political interests of the 
governrnent."60 Likewise the position might have been very different for Downie 
Stewart if his vote against the reductions had jeopardised the House's confidence 
in the government. 
Under FPP systems, collective responsibility has been rejected as a constitutional 
convention on the basis that it is of insufficient constitutional significance. 
61 This 
was on two grounds. The first is that a clear breach of the doctrine did not result 
in significant political upheaval. We have seen, however, that this is a rather 
vague measure of constitutional significance. It is unclear exactly what is meant 
by the use of the word "significant." The second is that the rule protects party, 
rather than constitutional, interests. We recall that one test for conventional status 
was whether the practice transcended "the sectional interests" of political parties. 
The basis for this criticism was that collective responsibility applied equally to 
opposition front benches, without any constitutional significance whatsoever. 
62 
Both arguments above seem, however, to downplay the tripartite nature of 
collective responsibility. The wider doctrine consists of unanimity, 
confidentiality and confidence, acting in concert. Loss of confidence might 
precipitate a change of government, which could satisfy the test of significant 
60 John Roberts Politicians, Public Servants and Public Enterprise: Restructuring the New Zealand 
Government Executive (Victoria University Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1987) 51 
61 "The Hon D F Quigley ' s Resignation", above n9 , 434 See also Jaconelli , above n 11 . 
62 The Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, claimed that Derek Quigley ' s speech to the Young Nationals 
breached "constitutional convention" . This has been forcefully denied by Joseph , who attributes the forced 
resignation to purely party political interests. "The Hon D F Quigley ' s Resignation" above n9 . 
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political upheaval. Likewise, the fact that oppositions impose similar rules to 
those applied to governments does not reduce the constitutional significance of 
the latter. A clear breach of collective responsibility by a member of a 
government holding a majority of one in the House would be far more 
constitutionally significant than one occurring in an opposition party. In any 
event, the fact that actors invoking a rule were motivated by political interests 
should not necessarily vitiate its constitutional significance. 
Clearly, this is not an area which lends itself to easily drawn conclusions. It is 
clear, however, that collective responsibility in its traditional sense, was as much 
a matter of internal party politics as of high constitutional principle. In each case, 
the convention was defined by the relevant political actors, seemingly 
inconsistently, to suit their individual ends. The applicability of the rule was 
highly contentious, and much depended on the political climate of the time. That 
said, at least the nature of the rule, what it meant in theory, was relatively settled. 
D The Cabinet Manual and the Effects of Codification of the Convention prior 
to 2001 
Collective responsibility has figured in the Cabinet Manual since its creation in 
1979. This document provides "how to do it" guidance on aspects of Cabinet 
d . 1 d. 1 . 63 con uct, me u mg re evant conventions. It has been described variously as an 
"accumulation of cabinet practices and procedures"64 and "an authoritative guide 
to central government decision-making."65 Although clearly of significance in 
terms of its usefulness to Cabinet and those interested in the mechanics of cabinet 
government, it has, as a document, no legal force . It is an example of "soft" 
codification. 
63 McLeay, ·'Cabinet Office Manual", above n34, 11 
64 Matthew Palmer, above n50 , 233 
65Marie Shroff, preface to the 200 I Cabinet Manual. 
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As is entirely to be expected, the Manual has been evolving since its inception. 
At that time, circulation was limited to a high political and official level.
66 
From 
its beginnings as an internal government document, it has become seen as "a 
primary source of information for those outside government on constitutional and 
procedural matters."67 This is reflected by its current availability on the Internet. 
Between 1996 and April 2001 , the Cabinet Office Manual contained the following 
statement: 
Collective Responsibility 
3.4 Decisions at Cabinet and Cabinet Committee meetings are usually reached by 
consensus. Votes are rarely taken. Once a decision has been made, however, it 
is to be supported collectively by all Ministers, regardless of their personal 
views and whether or not they were at the meeting concerned. 
3.5 The convention of collective responsibility is an essential underpinning of the 
system of Cabinet government, whereby Ministers are required to advise the 
sovereign (in practice, the Governor-General) on matters of public importance. 
Ministers whose opposition to a Cabinet decision is such that they wish to 
publicly disassociate themselves from it must first resign from the Cabinet. 
In terms of accuracy, this followed closely traditional expressions of the nature of 
the convention. 68 Perhaps this is explained by the convention being relatively 
settled in terms of its nature . Likewise, the endorsement of the Manual by a new 
Cabinet, at its first meeting reinforced its authority. Those factors combined to 
afford the Manual considerable authority as a source for those seeking the nature 
of the convention. 
The authoritativeness of the Manual as a statement of current practice, however, 
was slightly more arguable . The Manual described the doctrine in terms which 
suggested little flexibility . This was, as we have seen, not the case. The 
convention was interpreted at different times in highly flexible ways and 
important factors in the consideration of whether a Minister should resign 
66 1979 Cabinet Office Manual , preface. 
67 Shroff, above n65 
68 "Cabinet Government " above n37 , 277 . A comparison ofthe terms of the 1996 Cabinet Manual in this 
area with the description offered by Chamberlain above, indicates the stable nature of the convention. 
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included the gravity of the breach and its implications. Different cases, as a 
comparison of the Couch and Quigley incidents indicates, have led to 
dramatically different results. 
While recognised as an authoritative statement as to the nature of the convention, 
the Manual could be criticised for failing to reflect the political pragmatism 
inherent in the doctrine. This was recognised by the Labour/ Alliance coalition, 
and the result was the new edition of the Cabinet Manual, published in April 
2001. Following an examination of recent influences on the rule, we will 
examine the latest form of the Manual. We will see that it reflects the high level 
of flexibility in the present government ' s approach to the doctrine. 
IV INFLUENCES ON THE DOCTRINE OF COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
If changes in external circumstances occur, then conventions often adapt to suit 
the prevailing conditions. The New Zealand situation, as it applies to the doctrine 
of collective responsibility, has been the subject of this sort of change in the last 
two decades. Primarily this has been seen in legislation opening up public access 
to governmental information and the adoption of the MMP electoral system. 
A The Official Information Act 1982 
In 1982, the Official Information Act was enacted "to promote good government 
and enhancement of respect for the law by enabling more effective public 
participation in the making and administration of the law, and increasing the 
accountability of Ministers and officials."69 Official Information is defined as any 
information held by a department or organisation or a Minister of the Crown, in 
his or her official capacity. 70 The Act contains a presumption that information 
will be released unless there is a "good reason" for it being withheld.71 Good 
69 Official Information Act 1982, Section 4. 
70 Section 2 
71 Section 5 
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reasons for withholding information include maintenance of constitutional 
conventions, presumably including unanimity and confidentiality.
72 
The function of reviewing decisions by ministers or departments in this area has 
fallen to the Ombudsmen. 73 They have released guidelines "to help holders of 
official information in their consideration ofrequests for information."
74 These 
guidelines make it clear, however, that cases need to be assessed on their merits, 
measured against the statutory standards. At least theoretically, this could lead to 
inconsistent decisions. 75 
The Act seeks to achieve a balance between electorate participation in the process 
of government and the maintenance of good government in an efficient way. The 
democratic principle of enhanced public involvement in the administration of 
government suggests that informed criticism of government policy is an ideal to 
be encouraged. Ministers are collectively accountable to the legislature. 
However, an inherent part of that accountability is the confidentiality that 
prevents information being released as to the views of individual Ministers. 
These two interests will not always be mutually inclusive. 
The Act has become a particularly effective tool in the hands of opposition parties 
in New Zealand. They use Official Information Act requests as a weapon to 
embarrass government. These can expose inconsistencies, for example, between 
answers provided to the House during parliamentary question time and the 
information provided pursuant to the request. Likewise, Official Information Act 
requests can expose disagreements between Ministers. A recent example 
concerns the former Chief Executive of Work and Income New Zealand, 
Christine Rankin. It had been announced by the Government that the WINZ and 
72 Section 9(2)(f) 
73 Section 28( 1) 
74 Ombudsmens Practice Guidelines - No 2 
75 This has given rise to something of a circuitous anomaly. The decision-maker is called upon to interpret 
the nature of the convention and its applicability to the present case. As we have seen, the status of the 
doctrine is defined to an extent by the operation of the Act. The official is now back where they started. 
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Ministry of Social Policy were to be merged. This would result in the loss of Ms 
Rankin's job. The National Party made an Official Information Act request 
concerning discussions between Cabinet Ministers as to how this would be 
achieved. It sought to gain political capital out of the fact that there had been 
disagreement between the relevant ministers as to the wisdom of the proposed 
1. 76 po icy . 
Ministers will often disagree in private and sometimes commit their views to 
paper. This information is potentially available under the Official Information 
Act. Opposition parties, the media and the public are, in practice, able to gain 
access to information which indicates policy differences. Should the fiction be 
continued that Cabinet acts as one and there is no disagreement as to policy? To 
do so would perpetrate a kind of political naivety. This seems to be at odds with 
the ethos of the Official Information Act that the public should be better informed 
about the conduct of democracy in this country. A recognition of different 
approaches to policy within Cabinet would be more consistent. 
B The Introduction of MMP 
In 1996, New Zealand elected its first government under the MMP electoral 
system. Under FPP the New Zealand legislature, like its counterpart in the United 
Kingdom, was dominated by two major political parties. These parties alternated 
between occupation of the government and opposition benches, and ruled alone. 
Ideologically, they tended not to differ greatly, the primary fight being one over 
the political middle ground. 
Expected outcomes of the introduction of MMP included: 
(i) A greater number of parties in Parliament. 
(ii) Greater likelihood of coalition governments. 77 
76 The Evening Post, " Mallard Denies Rankin Plot", 19 April 200 I . 
77 '"The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand", above n34, , 26 
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(iii) More consultation in terms of negotiated policy positions. 
(iv) Less pressure on Cabinet ministers to agree publicly with coalition 
Cabinet decisions. 78 
These predictions have turned out to be prophetic. Both the 1996 and 1999 
elections resulted, at least at the outset, in coalition governments. This has led to a 
number of results. It has become harder for government policy to be determined 
unilaterally. 79 The need to gamer numbers for support in the House has resulted 
in greater levels of consultation and negotiation on policy. Smaller parties are 
able to advocate policy interests in exchange for support of Government-
sponsored legislative initiatives. Without that party's support in the legislature, 
the senior partner might be exposed to a loss on a confidence vote. 
A criticism that the Cabinet holds different views on individual policy issues loses 
its sting in the context of coalition government. It is natural that two or more 
parties, united in coalition government, will hold different policy positions on 
certain issues. Negotiation and compromise are inevitable. 
C Party Distinction and Coalition Management 
To see the current status of collective cabinet responsibility in its proper context, 
one has examine the Coalition Agreement signed by the Labour and Alliance 
parties following the 1999 General Election. It dealt primarily with what is 
described as ''coalition management." One of its stated objectives was "to 
provide stable and effective long-term government for New Zealand without 
losing the distinctive political identity of either party."80 
The Coalition Agreement introduced the notion of "party distinction". This term 
describes policies on which agreement could not be contemplated without a 
78 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer, Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP , (3'd 
edition, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997), 14 
79 Palmer and Palmer, above n78 , 18 
80 The Labour/Allianc(:! Coalition Agreement 
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perceptible shift in one or other party's political standpoint or manifesto position. 
These were expected to be infrequent. However, the recognition of this 
phenomenon is not to be under-rated in terms of its importance. A Management 
Committee was created to deal with issues of dispute resolution and "strategic 
political management". This committee comprises the two leaders, their Deputies 
and the two senior whips. Obviously the politics of Coalition management 
warranted membership of a high political calibre. 
The mechanics of "party distinction" are highly significant in the context of 
collective responsibility. The Agreement declares that the parties will operate 
within the convention of collective responsibility " . . . subject to the provisions of 
this Agreement. . . " The Agreement provides that in the event of an issue being 
identified as one of party distinction "there may be public differentiation between 
the parties in speech and vote which will not be regarded as being in breach of the 
Convention." Disagreement between coalition partners has become a valid, if 
supposedly infrequent, outcome of policy negotiation. 
The Coalition Agreement indicates a preparedness by the parties to define 
"Collective Cabinet Responsibility" in their own terms. In that sense, the 
Agreement is an endorsement both of the power of the positive morality of 
conventions and of the highly politicised nature of collective responsibility . 
While this may have been the way in which issues of collective responsibility 
were approached traditionally, the Coalition Agreement expressed this notion 
overtly for the first time. 
Curiously, in political terms, the issue of party distinction might strengthen the 
bonds between coalition partners. After all , it seems more healthy on a 
potentially divisive issue to agree to disagree rather than an attempt to argue the 
other side around. The parties are then free to go about seeking support in the 
House for their positions. In a seemingly highly democratic result, the party 
which is able to secure a parliamentary majority, if not Cabinet agreement, will 
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see its policy enacted into law. The other coalition partner is able to retain a sense 
of policy integrity before its supporters. 
D An Erosion of the Doctrine? 
The introduction of both the Official Information Act 1982 and the MMP 
electoral system were designed to improve the public's access to the workings of 
government. The purpose behind these changes was to improve the practice of 
New Zealand ' s democracy. It is submitted that they reflect a growing level of 
maturity and political sophistication within the electorate at large. The electorate 
sought greater consultation, and the MMP system and the freedom of information 
legislation both contribute to the achievement of these goals. 
The perceived success of the Official Information Act and the public endorsement 
of a proportional electoral system suggest an electorate that does not need to 
pretend that its government ministers think as one. 81 It is more prepared to accept 
the concept of government by debate, discussion, negotiation and compromise. 
Unanimity is, therefore, perceived less as a practical necessity for good 
government and more as an incidental by-product of good government. This 
places less emphasis on the need for confidentiality within government. In light 
of the influence of these external factors, it is not surprising that the mechanics of 
Cabinet government should be revisited. 
To take an example from the present government, the Labour party has been 
forced to look further than its traditional support group for the required votes to 
pass its intended superannuation legislation. The Green party would not support 
the policy. The New Zealand First Party would support it. The government 
therefore had at its disposal the votes it required, seemingly at a low level of 
political cost. 
81 The Act has been described as working "relatively effectively to further its stated purposes." Law 
Commission Report 40 Review of the Official Information Act 1982, ix. A majority of submitters to a 
parliamentary inquiry into MMP wished to see it retained. Report on the Inquiry into MMP, 8. 
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The changes for the convention signalled by the coalition agreement are 
significant in light of Marshall's view that unilateral conventional change is not 
permissible. The concept of "party distinction" was not referred to any of the 
opposition parties for their comment. If the next government should do away 
with the coalition management system as currently operated, then Marshall's view 
would be vindicated. 
In the context of MMP, however, this view seems restrictive. Evolution of 
conventions by way of agreement is one thing in the context of a two-party 
system. MMP presents an entirely new range of challenges. To obtain the 
agreement of all parties to the introduction of the coalition management system 
would have been to court controversy. Definition of the new understanding of 
the convention would likely have resulted in much debate, with little certainty. In 
any event, the introduction of the coalition management system to the convention 
could only be regarded as "unilateral" if one sees the government on one hand, 
and opposition parties on the other, as forming two distinct but united camps. 
This seems more akin to FPP, and inappropriate to an MMP system. 
Regular re-interpretations of the nature of the doctrine would move it closer to 
party politics, and away from notions of "conventionality." The doctrine would 
become the expression solely of the current government's positive morality . On 
the other hand, if future governments should adopt the coalition management 
system, the doctrine would be elevated above the party political level. While we 
might still ask "is it a convention," we would not need regularly to enquire as to 
what the terms of the rule are . It would regain a sense of constitutional stability. 
Whether this is likely to happen is a matter for speculation. The present 
government has managed to negotiate some difficult policy issues by means of the 
coalition management system. While the concept of party distinction has only 
been utilised once, it seems likely that smaller parties currently in opposition 
would be in favour of retaining the "agree to disagree" process. It allows them 
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opportunities to communicate to the electorate in general, and party faithful in 
particular, the fact that on a particular issue they had fought and lost. However, 
the capacity of smaller parties ' to negotiate for themselves favourable coalition 
agreement terms will depend on prevailing political conditions. 
The impact of the Official Information Act and the introduction of MMP has been 
a re-definition of the roles of the various elements which make up the doctrine of 
collective cabinet responsibility. As greater consultation and transparency have 
become hallmarks of the political landscape, the need for confidentiality and strict 
unanimity have reduced. The conversion of Cabinet from a one party to a two 
party or multi-party organisation has called for an institutionalised system to deal 
with issues between the parties. Rather than an erosion of the convention, it 
would be better to describe recent the changes as a "re-definition." This has 
exposed the doctrine to residual uncertainty. 
The next government might compound the problem, by rejecting the changes. It 
might ease the problem, by endorsing them. It could also further re-define the 
rule. This might lead to continued uncertainty about the exact nature of the rule . 
On the other hand, it might indicate a trend. If commentators saw the doctrine 
moving consistently in one direction, that might give an indication of stable 
evolution, rather than a lurching back and forth. In any event, it will be some 
time before this issue gains a sense ofreal clarity. 
V THE CABINET MANUAL - 2001 EDITION 
A The Philosophy Behind the New Manual 
The new Manual was clearly influenced by the style of government signposted by 
the Coalition Agreement. 82 Four days after the execution of the Agreement, a 
recommendation was made by the Prime Minister, observing that "the Cabinet 
Office has identified a number of provisions in the Manual which are now out of 
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date." The Memorandum recommended a review, including "specific proposals 
for amending the current provisions in the Manual concerning collective 
responsibility. "83 
The philosophy behind the changes can be seen in two themes, which percolate 
through the Cabinet papers that preceded the new edition. The first is a sense that 
the Cabinet Manual is "Cabinet's document," to do with as it pleases. It was 
noted that "Cabinet can tailor or supplement the administrative procedures set out 
in the Manual to reflect the changing needs of Government."
84 
The other theme relates to the role the Manual has to play in government. The 
Manual is described in various Cabinet papers as "a high level authoritative text, 
articulating central Government principles, values and procedures [ carrying] great 
authority because it is an enduring guide to the operation of central Government 
operating at a level above party politics."85 Discussion papers circulated during 
the consideration of the change make it clear that this government's view is that 
there is scope for considerable variety in the manner in which individual 
administrations will govern themselves . To that extent, the Cabinet Manual is 
seen as inappropriate for the provision of detailed administrative statements. 
The 2001 edition of the Manual combines the convention with notions of party 
distinction and coalition management. It re-defines the convention. As we will 
see, the degree to which parties presently in opposition agree with the wisdom of 
the current coalition management formula, and the changes to the Manual, remain 
to be seen . 
82 In fact, the Coalition Agreement refers to a review of the Manual to be completed within the first six 
months of office. 
83 Cabinet Memorandum "Coalition Agreement Between the Labour and Alliance Parties and the Cabinet 
Office Manual ", CAB(99) 781 released under the Official Information Act 1982. 
84 Helen Clark, Memorandum for Cabinet, "Coalition Agreement Between the Labour and Alliance Parties 
and Cabinet Office Manual" released under the Official Information Act 1982. 
85 Cabinet Policy Committee Memorandum "Cabinet Office Manual Review: Overview" POL(OO) 96 
released under the Official Information Act 1982 . 
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B The Changes to the Manual 
1 Name 
First and foremost among the changes made to the Manual is a change in the 
name. Until the most recent edition, the document had been known as the Cabinet 
Office Manual. Discussion papers make it clear that this was felt to be something 
of a misnomer. Rightly, it was thought that some might consider that the 
document dealt with the protocols of the Cabinet Office, rather than Cabinet 
itself. 86 
2 Confidentiality 
Under the heading "confidentiality", the terms of the former edition's paragraph 
3.3 are largely repeated . These provide that Cabinet meetings are confidential, 
that no formal minutes are taken, and that ministers should not disclose views 
expressed. 87 In relation to the requirement that forthcoming issues are 
confidential, the new edition adds the phrase "outside Cabinet approved 
consultation procedures." This is largely a reflection of the realities of life in the 
MMP environment. Consultation with caucuses and even with opposition parties 
is envisaged under the new regime. 
3 Unanimity 
Under the heading "Collective Responsibility" the Manual now sets out five 
paragraphs. The section begins with the statement that "the principle of 
collective responsibility underpins the system of Cabinet government". 
88 The 
relegation of the convention to "principle" status is clear evidence of its arguable 
constitutional nature. 
86 POL (00) 96 above n84 
87 Cabinet Manual paragraph 3.19 
88 Cabinet Manual paragraph 3.20 
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At paragraph 3 .22, the Manual provides that: 
Ministers are expected to show careful judgment when referring to party 
policy that differs from government policy. Subject to paragraph 3 .23 , a 
Minister' s support and responsibility for the collective government position 
must always be clear. 
Paragraph 3 .23 provides 
Coalition governments may decide to establish "agree to disagree" processes, 
which may allow Ministers to maintain, in public, different party positions on 
particular issues or policies. Once the final outcome of any "agree to 
disagree issue or policy has been determined ( either at Cabinet level or 
through some other agreed process), Ministers must implement the resulting 
decision or legislation, regardless of their position throughout the decision-
making process . 
This mirrors the statement in the Coalition Agreement to the effect that the 
convention of collective responsibility would be observed "subject to" the 
agreement to disagree procedures. However, paragraph 3.24 of the Manual 
provides an important caveat. It stresses that the processes referred to in 
paragraph 3.23 "may only be used in relation to different party positions." The 
section finishes with a warning that public dissociation from Cabinet decisions 
outside agreed processes is "unacceptable". This in itself provides a significant 
restatement from the position in the previous Manual. The requirement of 
resignation as the quid pro quo for public dissociation with Cabinet policy has 
been removed. 
Cabinet papers released under the Official Information Act 1982 make it clear that 
this was done with an eye to political flexibility. It was thought that the Prime 
Minister ' s response to an alleged breach may ' depend upon the seriousness of the 
breach, past incidents etc. "
89 Whether a Minister will inevitably be required to 
resign in the event that they disagree publicly with Cabinet policy is untested 
under the new regime. Clearly though, the question of a dissenting minister ' s 
89 Memorandum for Cabinet Policy Committee, Released under the Official Information Act 1982 
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future will go beyond the issue of whether their statement was contrary to Cabinet 
policy. 
Will this system reduce the likelihood of disaffection on the part of individual 
ministers? The answer is that it probably will not. Negotiations over policy in the 
context of a coalition government have similarities to those conducted under 
circumstances of single-party majority government.
9° Coalitions, like single party 
governments, are broad churches. They are, however, also highly pragmatic. A 
particular Minister from a minority coalition party might be so valuable or 
popular within that party that it is unwilling to submit to majority calls for 
resignation. That would, in tum, raise the issue of the degree to which the senior 
partner is able to influence the junior partner' s views. If the junior partner holds a 
balance of power then this might become a live issue. The outcome of dissent 
might likewise depend on the policy issue at stake. 
C A "Strange Device" Comes of Age 
Foremost among the changes made to the Cabinet Manual is the introduction of 
an acknowledgement that, in certain circumstances, parties within coalition 
governments may "agree to differ" . Parties are able publicly to hold different 
positions on policy without compromising the doctrine of collective 
responsibility. This stems from a need perceived for junior coalition partners to 
"brand" their policies. There can be "considerable incentives for smaller parties 
to let their constituencies know when they have fought and lost on a particular 
issue in Cabinet. "
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Agreements to disagree were not unheard of under the FPP system. However, 
they fitted so poorly into the traditional model that they caused constitutional 
scholars grave problems. In 1932 a United Kingdom cabinet resolution that 
individual stances could be taken on the issue of tariffs was criticised as 
90 Matthew Palmer, above n50, 227 
unconstitutional. In 1959, Sir Ivor Jennings described this course of action as a 
"strange device. " Under an FPP system that view is understandable. A divided 
Cabinet would allow the Opposition to present to the electorate a picture of a 
party that is insufficiently agreed on policy that they have no right to govern. 
Likewise, a divided Cabinet or caucus could raise real issues of confidence within 
the House. 
New Zealand has embraced, however, a proportional representation system and 
the politics of compromise that that entails. This results in governments being 
created out of combinations of parties which could not be expected to agree on 
every policy. To that extent, agreements to disagree can be seen as the ultimate 
compromise. They allow the parties to at least agree that their combination is 
unable to resolve a particular issue. If the policy in question is to be taken further , 
then other avenues have to be explored. 
This creates a stronger democracy in a number of ways. Parties are left free to 
retain their political identity in a system which often calls for compromise and 
occasional movement away from the strict philosophical basis of an individual 
party. It also allows for a stronger Cabinet by avoiding the instability that might 
follow on from disagreement within Cabinet. A single issue is far less likely to 
bring down a government. Perhaps most importantly, the agreement to disagree 
policy allows a coalition partner to seek support for its policies outside Cabinet. 
In relation to the Singapore Free Trade Agreement, the Labour party was able to 
secure the votes it needed in the House from the Opposition benches. Negative 
effects of this on the Labour/ Alliance coalition would appear to be limited. 
What was, therefore an anomalous and strange device under FPP has gained 
legitimacy in the maturing democracy that is New Zealand under MMP. The 
public appears to have accepted that coalitions will not be able to agree in all 
91 Cabinet Office Memorandum from R Kitteridge to M Shroff, Released under the Official Information 
Act 1982 
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instances. Instead of allowing this disagreement to destabilise the government, a 
result has been found which prevents policy stalemate. While a need for the 
Alliance party to present a more active and dynamic front may lead to more 
division within Cabinet as the next election draws near, almost two years into this 
coalition only one issue, the Singapore Free Trade Agreement, has been formally 
identified as an "agree to differ" issue. This is all the more remarkable given 
some of the potentially divisive issues this Cabinet has had to grapple with, 
including the creation of the "Peoples' Bank" and paid maternity leave. 
D How does the new Statement impact on the doctrine of collective 
responsibility? 
The role of the Manual has been described as descriptive rather than prescriptive. 
The Secretary of Cabinet has suggested that "amendments to the provisions 
dealing with the constitutional conventions may reflect and promulgate change, 
but they can not, in themselves, effect change.',92 However, in light of New 
Zealand's recent adoption of the coalition management system, this statement 
seems to downplay the significance of the Manual's role. 
The new statement as to the convention was foreseen from the inception of the 
present coalition. While the Manual post-dates the Coalition Agreement, the 
provisions dealing with collective responsibility go hand in hand with the terms of 
the latter document. The Coalition Agreement provides insight into the nature of 
the relationship between the coalition partners. It does not deal substantively, 
however, with the convention. That is done in the Manual. It is the Manual that 
describes the relationship between the concepts of party distinction and collective 
responsibility. In the same sense, the Coalition Agreement ' s operation ceases 
when the coalition dies ; the Cabinet Manual has at least the potential to live on.
93 
92 Marie Shroff, "The Role of the Secretary of the Cabinet; The View from the Beehive." Speech delivered 
at Victoria University on 31 July 2001 . Forthcoming New Zealand Centre for Public Law Occasional 
Paper (VUW) . 
93 McLeay, " Cabinet Office Manual", above n34 , 15 
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In terms of Marshall's analysis, the Manual is descriptive of this government's 
positive morality. In terms of the critical morality, however, things are more 
doubtful. The Manual is intended to rise above party politics. Its provisions 
suggest infrequent revision. However, the Manual plays a critical role in the 
present government's intention to effect changes in the way collective 
responsibility works in this country. The introduction of the concept of party 
distinction in the Coalition Agreement, and the re-casting of the rules of collective 
responsibility in the Manual , make the latter statements part of the process of 
effecting change. The new statement is both prospective and prescriptive. 
Notwithstanding all of this, it is submitted that the changes to the Manual do not 
indicate an erosion in the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility in this 
country. Rather, the convention has evolved to reflect an increasing transparency 
in government, and a more consultative parliamentary process. Cabinet remains, 
on the whole, confidential , and the principle of unanimity is likewise generally 
observed. It is appropriate for the pragmatic nature of the convention to be 
recognised. The fundamentals remain the same. The new edition of the Manual 
provides recognition of this. 
E Effects of Codification 
New Zealand has had a codified statement of the nature of collective cabinet 
responsibility for some 22 years now. In other words, when the first Cabinet 
Office Manual was drafted, New Zealand engaged in a "recognition and 
declaration" exercise. We have already seen that the seemingly inflexible terms 
of the rule contained in earlier editions reduced the degree to which they could be 
considered as accurate statements of the nature of the convention. New Zealand 
has now recognised and declared a re-definition of the nature of the convention. 
The effects of the change in the statement will largely depend on the authority the 
new statement has. 
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J The Accuracy Factor 
The accuracy of the new statement can be assessed in two ways. First, in relation 
to the present government it should be expected that the new edition of the 
Manual would be accorded considerable authority as a statement of the current 
nature of collective cabinet responsibility. The Manual clearly expresses this 
government ' s "rule book" for self-administration. Agreement was reached at 
Cabinet level that the changes to the Manual should be endorsed. The Manual is 
really this Cabinet ' s statement as to how it defines collective responsibility. 
In tandem with the Coalition Agreement, the two parties have created systems for 
the definition of what does and does not constitute a breach of the doctrine. In 
creating the coalition management committee, the parties have appointed an 
arbiter of this question, and removed issues of definition from individuals. 
Arguably, this will lead to fewer questions about both the nature of the convention 
and its applicability to given situations by individual political actors . 
94 
Secondly, on a more objective level, the new Manual is to be preferred to its 
predecessor. The convention is necessarily flexible and pragmatic in its 
operation. The consequences of alleged breaches have always depended on the 
facts of the individual case. This has been recognised by the present government. 
The introduction of the Coalition Management Committee and the removal of the 
resignation requirement from the Manual are reflections of this. Individual 
political actors know from the outset that their conduct will be assessed by the 
Prime Minister. and can act accordingly. In essence, the Manual now expresses 
more clearly the pragmatism inherent in the convention. 
In both senses then, the Manual can be seen as accurately expressing the 
convention as it applies to this government. However, whether or not history 
regards the Manual as accurately expressing the nature of the convention at this 
94 Sampford, above n2, 369 
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time depends largely on the next factor , the degree to which it is regarded as 
authoritative by all politicians. 
2 The Acceptance Factor 
Much of the impetus for change to the Manual derived from concerns that smaller 
parties be able to brand their policies. It is possible that smaller parties will make 
acceptance of the coalition management system a condition of entry into 
coalitions. This is, however, a matter of speculation. Much will depend on 
prevailing political circumstances. Should future coalition governments adopt the 
Manual , as has been the traditional course of action, its authoritativeness as a 
statement of the doctrine will grow in time. 
However, the more a government alters the provisions of the Manual , the less 
likely it is that subsequent governments will give the changes unqualified 
endorsement. The Cabinet Manual is, at least in relation to the provisions 
concerning collective responsibility, tied to the coalition management system. It 
is, therefore, equally susceptible to rejection by future governments. 
Alternatively, a future government could decide to operate a more inflexible 
system, without changing the terms of the Manual. The collective responsibility 
provisions are drafted so widely that this would not be inconsistent. However, it 
would certainly raise doubts about the accuracy of the Manual as a statement of 
current practice. What the Manual says and what the government does will be 
two different things . 
None of the other political parties have commented publicly on the changes to the 
Manual or outlined positions on the effects on the doctrine of collective 
responsibility. If a statement as to the nature of a convention has the authority it 
is accorded, the question is what would be the constitutional authoritativeness of 
the Manual if the next government were to reject the new edition and revert to a 
former one. The answer to this question is that uncertainty over the nature of both 
the convention and the status of the Manual would reign. Regular revisions of the 
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Manual would result in it being seen more as a statement of that government' s 
policy, rather than being above party politics. The Manual would be authoritative 
for present purposes only, rather than qualifying as a "high level authoritative 
text." 
3 The Agreement Factor 
Doubtless, were other political parties consulted on the proposed changes, the 
authority of the Manual at the present time would be greater. The practice of 
newly elected cabinets agreeing to the current Manual provides a mechanism for 
certainty. It would be considerably harder for an incoming government that had 
agreed to the changes to resile from this once elected. It would be easier to 
attribute the high constitutional role envisaged for the Manual during the re-
drafting process. 
This approach is, however, not without its pitfalls . Definition of constitutional 
conventions by groups has proved difficult in Australia. 
95 It is submitted that in 
New Zealand, the most appropriate means of dealing with this difficult issue has 
been adopted. Wide-ranging consultation was unlikely to lead to a settled, yet 
accurate statement. While further change to the Manual would doubtless cause 
confusion as to New Zealand ' s position, it seems likely that sooner or later, things 
will settle down. The introduction of MMP was always going to result in a 
revision of some aspects of our constitution. Assuming that MMP is retained, 
new outcomes and scenarios will become fewer, and conventions and rules will 
become more stable. 
F Has "Soft" Codification inhibited Conventional Evolution? 
We have seen that one of the outcomes of codification of the convention of 
collective responsibility has been the clarification of the nature of the convention, 
subject to acceptance by other parties at a later date. Should this be the case, the 
position in New Zealand will be clear. However, some might ask at what cost? 
95 Sampford, above n2, 369 
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Soft codification has been criticised as being a potential inhibitor of constitutional 
change. "Although codified practice might in theory be expected to develop, the 
reality would be that politicians would risk controversy if they departed from an 
authoritatively declared precedent. "96 This shows a fear that the source will 
overcome the political actors in definition of the convention. 
To a degree, of course, we have seen that that is one of the outcomes of 
codification. 97 It may well be, however, that this fear has to be seen in the light of 
the fact that it is expressed in the United Kingdom, where collective responsibility 
remains defined by the FPP system. There has been no codified statement made, 
for the theory to be tested. 
The New Zealand experience suggests, however, that fears of the convention 
being cemented into the terms of the codified statement are unwarranted. If this 
were not the case, the doctrine of collective responsibility would have remained 
static. As we have seen, this is not the case. Rather than stifling conventional 
evolution, the codification of the convention has encouraged development in two 
ways. First, it has not stood in the way of the development of the convention as a 
result of the introduction of the Official Information Act 1982 and the MMP 
electoral system. Secondly, the Manual has itself evolved into an expression of a 
more flexible convention, in which the players define as they go , the nature of the 
convention. Its evolution will doubtless continue. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The theme of this paper has been the changing nature of the convention of 
collective responsibility in New Zealand . It would be wrong, however, to 
overstate the effects of these changes on the doctrine . Collective responsibility 
remains a vital element of Cabinet government in this country. While it has been 
through a process of re-definition, it would be wrong to regard this as an 
96 Hough, above n3 , 382 
97 Sampford, above n2 , 391 
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"erosion". A number of factors at the heart of the doctrine remain unchanged. 
Coalition government still requires individuals to support cabinet policy. The 
penalty of resignation remains within the prerogative of the Prime Minister. 
The present government has acknowledged the inherently pragmatic nature of the 
convention and constructed a framework for coalition management which reflects 
this. This has allowed the doctrine to continue to be relevant in the context of a 
more consultative and transparent governmental system. The method of change, 
while exposing the doctrine to a period of uncertainty, was a viable and valid 
means of responding to the challenges posed by the shifting political climate. 
Any residual uncertainty could be cured early in the term of the next government. 
The Cabinet Manual "recognises and declares" the new form of the convention. 
Whether its function in the process of change can be described as purely 
descriptive is a matter of contention. Its authoritativeness as a statement of the 
practice of this government is undoubted. Its authoritativeness as a statement of 
the doctrine will be measured largely by the reaction of the next few governments 
to the coalition management system. 
The question of where the balance lies between the evolution of the doctrine and 
the Manual is one of form and substance. While the Manual has played a 
significant role in a re-definition of the convention, political conduct and the 
prevailing political circumstances will continue to be what truly define the 
convention. While the Manual remained the same between 1996 and 2001 , 
external factors influenced the way the convention was perceived. This led to the 
1999 Coalition Agreement and the revision of the Cabinet Manual. Change in 
substance promoted change in form. 
There is a further role for the process of codification that is worthy of note. 
Constitutional conventions have been characterised as a means for unchecked 
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constitutional power on the part of the executive. 
98 This criticism is 
understandable, coming as it does from the United Kingdom, where calls for some
 
form of clarification of the definitions of constitutional conventions have been 
made, but largely unheeded. In 1992, Rodney Brazier complained that ''a citizen 
cannot know with anything approaching certainty what are the many major rules 
which affect the way in which he is governed. This lack of specificity is 
intolerable."99 Little seems to have changed through the 1990s. Last year, the 
system of constitutional conventions was said to "notwithstanding their profound 
effects, inhabit the darker almost furtive regions of political consciousness."'
00 
The former complaint seems to overstate the problems for conventions in terms o
f 
their embodiment of democratic principles. Both belie the fact that, even when 
authoritatively stated, conventions are difficult concepts. They each recognise, 
however. a preference for at least some statement, rather than the inherently 
subjective nature of the convention in its unstated form. 
In New Zealand, however, the changes to the Cabinet Manual can be seen as 
playing a significant part in this country ' s move towards a more transparent form 
of government. It has emerged, from being on numbered circulation only to the 
most senior politicians and officials, to worldwide availability through the 
Internet. In that respect, it might be thought that New Zealand is to be envied, 
with a statement of cabinet's rules that is endorsed by the government, taking 
account of the more open nature of government in this country. Perhaps more 
importantly, New Zealand and the Cabinet Manual will be held up as a successful 
model for the codification of constitutional conventions. 
• Hough,aboven3, 370 
99 Brazier, above n23 , 284 
100 Hough, above n3 , 370 
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